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SPECIAL CONTRIBUTIONS

Local Government and
Constitutional Torts: In the
Georgia Courts
by R. Perry Sentell, Jr.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

The concept of governmental immunity from civil responsibility has
long troubled many. An ingredient of this country's common law
heritage, the concept nevertheless yields the epitome in philosophic faceoffs. On the one hand, we inherently disavow governmental divinity:
we subscribe to a rule-of-law demand that government restores what it
destroys. On the other hand, we recognize that government's essential
mission is unique and involuntary: we understand that a strictly
private-sector accounting may well imperil government's public

* Carter Professor of Law, University of Georgia School of Law. University of Georgia
(A.B., 1956; LL.B., 1958); Harvard University (LL.M., 1961). Member, State Bar of
Georgia.
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performance. Traditionally, neither position has completely prevailed,
and legal history unfolds a striking account of accommodation.
None of the accounts is more striking than that originating with the
United States' Forty-Second Congress, a legislature operating against
the immediate background of the Civil War. That Congress, on April 20,
1871, enacted legislation casting civil liability upon "persons" who, under
state auspices, deprive others of federally granted rights. In this
remarkable fashion, the "Civil Rights Act of 1871 "1 amalgamated state
tort law and violations of the Federal Constitution.2
In 1978, more than a century after the statute's enactment, the United
States Supreme Court abruptly applied it to local governments.' Since
that decision, "constitutional torts" have assumed high profile in efforts
to jettison local government immunity. These efforts proceed in all
states in both federal and state courts.
Georgia local governments have thus now experienced almost twenty
years of "constitutional tort" litigation. The time is appropriate,
therefore, for appraising that litigation's impact upon the state's
traditional local government tort immunity. Because such appraisals
typically emphasize federal law, state cases are often neglected. This
Article strives to remedy that neglect by marking the "constitutional tort
occasion" in the Georgia appellate courts.
II.

BACKGROUND

A.

Exposition
The origins are familiar, and the way is well traveled.4 In 1871 a
distraught national Congress, seeking "to enforce the provisions of the
Fourteenth Amendment,"' enacted the genesis legislation. That statute,
the "Civil Rights Act of 1871,"' encompassed the epic declaration later
codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983:

1. 17 Stat. 13 (1871).
2. The statute is presently codified as 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1996).
3. Monell v. Department of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
4.

See R. PERRY SENTELL, JR., GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENT LAWS ASSIMILATION OF

MONELL: SECTION 1983 AND THE NEW "PERSONS" (1984). This monograph describes both
the background and the immediate progeny of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 and Monett v.
Department of Social Services and analyzes the six years of case law in both federal and
state courts dealing with Georgia local governments following Monell. This paper employs
that discussion of early state court developments as its point of departure and brings the
analysis forward to the present.
5. 17 Stat. at 13.
6. Id
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Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be
subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress ....

7

Following enactment, however, this declaration of civil responsibility
suffered decades of dormancy.' Indeed, the United States Supreme
Court discovered the statute's viability only in 1961, and then only in a
significantly limited context. In the foundational case of Monroe v.
Pape,9 the Court declared the statute applicable on behalf of citizens
That
allegedly mistreated by thirteen Chicago police officers."°
applicability ran, however, only against the officers themselves; as for
the municipality, the Court in Monroe was unanimous: "[We hold that
a municipal corporation is not a 'person' within the meaning of [Section]
1983 . . . ."" In 1961, as in 1871, therefore, local governments2 remained free from Section 1983's imposition of civil responsibility.1
Seventeen years later, the Court came full circle. In 1978 in the
legendary setting of Monell v. Department of Social Services,18 the
Supreme Court reversed its course of 107 years. A majority of the Court
in Monell upheld complaints charging a municipality with forcing
premature leaves of absence upon its pregnant employees.' 4 Expressly
overruling its decision in Monroe,'" the Court undertook a "fresh

7. This provision was Section 1 of the Act, 17 Stat. 13, and was codified in 1874 as
Rev. Stat. § 1979.
8. Ronald Levin, The Section 1983 MunicipalImmunity Doctrine, 65 GEO. L.J. 1483,
1484 (1977).
9. 365 U.S. 167 (1961).
10. Id. at 172. The officers allegedly broke into and searched plaintiffs' home without
warrant and interrogated one of the plaintiffs for ten hours without warrant. Id. at 169.
11. Id. at 191 n.5.
12. The Court found unambiguous and conclusive guidance in Congress's adamant
rejection, during debate on the statute, of the "Sherman Amendment." That amendment
sought to expressly impose liability on a "county, city, or parish" for harms resulting from
riotous assemblages. Given the legislative antagonism to that proposal, the Court could
not believe "that the word 'person' was used in this particular Act to include" local governments. Id. at 190.
13. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
14. Id. at 660-61.
15. Id. at 663. The Court's opinion announced at its inception the overruling of Monroe
"insofar as it holds that local governments are wholly immune from suit under Section
1983." Id.
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analysis" of Section 1983's legislative history. 6 That analysis, the
Court announced, "compels the conclusion that Congress did intend
municipalities and other local government units to be included among
those persons to whom [Section] 1983 applies." 7
Basic applicability declared, the Court in Monell turned more
particularly to the statute's coverage. On the one hand, Section 1983
covered local government action that "implements or executes a policy
statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and
promulgated." 8 Likewise covered were "deprivations visited pursuant
to governmental 'custom' even though such a custom has not received
formal approval through the body's official decisionmaking channels." 9
On the other hand, the Court delineated, "a municipality cannot be held
liable solely because it employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a
municipality cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory."20 In summary, the Court asserted, "it is when
execution of a government's policy or custom, whether made by its
lawmakers or by those whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to
represent official policy, inflicts the injury that the government as an
entity is responsible under [Section] 1983. "21 As crafted, Monell's
local governments into the
precept of coverage plunged American
22
fathomless sea of "constitutional torts."

16. Id. at 665. Actually, the Sherman Amendment rejected by the Forty-Second
Congress was offered not in Section 1983 but to another section of the Civil Rights Act, and
the obligation proposed by the amendment and rejected by Congress was a different
obligation from that imposed by Section 1983. Id. at 683.
17. Id. at 690.
18. Id.
19. Id. at 691.
20. Id.
21. Id. at 694. Even today, some nineteen years later, the Supreme Court continues
to struggle with the local government dichotomy it created in Monell: respondeat superior
immunity and policy-or-custom liability. Witness the Court's five-to-four division in Board
of County Commissionersu. Brown, 117 S. Ct. 1382 (1997), involving county liability for a
deputy sheriff's alleged use of excessive force in effecting an arrest. To plaintiffs claim of
Section 1983 liability based on the sheriffs "single decision" to hire the deputy without an
adequate background review, the majority opinion imposed a requirement of"'deliberate
indifference' ... to ... known or obvious consequences." Id. at 1385. Reversing lower
court decisions of county liability, the Court reasoned that the lower tribunals had failed
to consider whether the deputy's background "made his use of excessive force in making
an arrest a plainly obvious consequence of the hiring decision." Id. at 1392. The Court
explained its decision as follows: "To prevent [county] liability for a hiring decision from
collapsing into respondeat superior liability, a court must carefully test the link between
the policymaker's inadequate decision and the particular injury alleged." Id. at 1391.
22. The term's origin is commonly attributed to Marshall S. Shapo, ConstitutionalTort:
Monroe v. Pape and the FrontiersBeyond, 60 Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965).
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B. Development
Amidst the confusion wrought by Monell's abrupt repudiation of the
past, uncertainty reigned supreme. One resulting doubt revolved around
forum-the appropriate court(s) for resolving a Section 1983 "action,"
"suit," or "proceeding."2 3 Neither the statute itself, nor (to this point)
the Supreme Court, had identified the judicial site for launching these
newly authorized complaints against local governments. Perhaps it was
simply assumed that federally declared rights, anchored in the Federal
Constitution and "laws," would naturally be pursued in the federal
courts. What implications did such a presumption hold for Section 1983
claimants desiring to sue local governments in state courts? The
quandary begged for clarification.
Two years following its decision in Monell, the Court paid the forum
24 There, the
issue at least passing attention in Martinez v. California.
Court referred to a "general rule" that there is no reason why a
congressionally-created right "'should not be enforced, if not provided
otherwise by some act of Congress, by a proper action in a State
court.'"25 Yet, the Court also conceded that it had never considered
"whether a state must entertain a claim under [Section] 1983. " 26
Somewhat tentatively, the Court in Martinez concluded as follows:
"[Wihere the same type of claim, if arising under state law, would be
enforced in the state courts, the state courts are generally not free to
refuse enforcement of the federal claim."27 In any event, by 1990 the
Court could look back upon a general practice that had largely rendered
the issue academic. "Virtually every State has expressly or by implication opened its courts to Section 1983 actions and there are no state
court systems that refuse to hear Section 1983 cases."28

23.

42 U.S.C. § 1983.

24. 444 U.S. 277 (1980). This action was against state officials for the release of a
parolee who murdered plaintiffs' decedent some five months after his parole. Plaintiffs
brought the action in the state courts and appealed their adverse judgments to the
Supreme Court. Id. at 277.
25. Id. at 284 n.7 (quoting Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386, 391 (1947)).
26. Id.
27. Id.
28. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 379 n.20 (1990) (citing STEVEN H. STEINGLASS,
SECTION 1983 LITIGATION IN STATE COURTS (1989)). Howlett featured an action under

Section 1983 against a Florida county school board with the Court reasoning as follows:
We conclude that whether the question is framed in pre-emption terms, as
petitioner would have it, or in the obligation to assume jurisdiction over a
"federal" cause of action, as respondent would have it, the Florida court's refusal
to entertain one discrete category of [Section] 1983 claims, when the court
entertains similar state law actions against state defendants, violates the
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Under both presumption and practice, it thus developed that the once
impotent Civil Rights Act of 1871 had worked a unique modern
revolution in the law of local government tort liability. Equally
impressive, moreover, the progeny of that revolution proceeded in
parallel fashion and on dual judicial fronts. The coexistence of those
fronts held the promise of continuing analytical intrigue.
Not surprisingly, legal scholarship has largely attended the federal
front. Exuding a rather typical preoccupation, that scholarship has
relentlessly pursued Section 1983 in both the Supreme Court and in the
lower federal courts throughout the country.2" Those courts, the
literature confirms, have witnessed a myriad of Section 1983 challenges
to the tort immunity traditionally claimed by American local governments. Obviously, lawyers in all states must be aware of that phenomenon.
Eachof those lawyers also needs the additional Section 1983 anthology
evolved by his or her respective state courts. As a concomitant
development, those epochs constitute a necessary part of the Monell
progeny. With that progeny now fast approaching its twenty-year
milestone, any account omitting the state court perspective offers a
grievously incomplete reflection.
III. GEORGIA: AT THE OUTSET (1978-1984)
Whatever the hesitations over the role of state courts in Section 1983
litigation, Georgia harbored none of them. Although Monell promptly
racked complete dissention upon the Georgia Court of Appeals, none of
the disagreement went to jurisdiction. In City of Atlanta v. Fry, s°
former police officers "alluded" to Monell in complaining of demotions
resulting from their exercise of First Amendment rights.3' In response,

Supremacy Clause.
Id. at 375.
29. Expressed reasons for preferring actions in the federal courts include a perceived
higher technical competence on the part of federal judges, a greater federal-court
receptivity to enforcement of Supreme Court pronouncements, and the federal judiciary's
insulation from majoritarian pressures. Burt Neuborne, The Myth of Parity,90 HARV. L.
REV. 1105 (1977). Expressed reasons for pursuing Section 1983 actions in state courts
include recent federal appointments that might render federal judges less receptive to
claims than state judges, the existence of federal precedents-not binding on state

judges--that may foreclose plaintiffs' claims, the different processes by which jurors are
selected in state and federal courts, and the convenience of litigating both federal and state
claims in the same court. STEINGLASS, supra note 28. These comparisons are drawn from
SHELDON H. NAHMOD ET AL., CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS 377-78 (1995).
30. 148 Ga. App. 269, 251 S.E.2d 90 (1978).

31. Id. at 269, 251 S.E.2d at 91. Plaintiffs alleged the demotions were a result of
comments attributed to them in a newspaper article concerning operations of the police
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a bare majority of the court summarily foreclosed the issue: there
simply was "no evidence that the appellees' demotion came about as the
result of the enforcement of an official city policy." 2 Taking strong
issue, a four-judge dissent urged plaintiffs' "civil rights" to protect
against "being capriciously transferred without cause to a less attractive
and lower paying job from one in which they were paid at least partly
by federal funds."33 As for evidence of municipal "policy," the dissent
was equally adamant: "Whatever 'official city policy' there may be in
demoting policemen for undue relationships with newspaper reporters,
it can only be surmised through the actions of the officer in charge of
these departments.'
Fry thus constituted Georgia's initial, and immediate, state court
fallout from Monell. Divided as closely as possible, the court of appeals
came to analytical blows over the Supreme Court's "policy or custom"
concept. "Policy," the majority insisted, must trigger plaintiffs' depriva"Deprivation," the
tions and must appear in plaintiffs' evidence.'
dissent countered, was clear, and execution by a city department
necessarily manifested municipal "policy." 6 The conceptual standoff
was substantial; it promised a Georgia evolution of substantive, and
independent, significance.
Constitutional torts then broke with full fury upon the Georgia
Supreme Court. The preliminary event, Davis v. City of Roswell, 7
featured a police officer's conduct in delaying transportation of plaintiff's
critically ill wife to a hospital.3 " The supreme court, via a four-justice
majority opinion, reversed the trial court's judgment of municipal
immunity.39 The court emphasized plaintiff's reliance upon Section
1983: "It is a federal right of action asserted here, and it is controlled
by federal law."4 The court recalled Monell's distinction between
"negligence or respondeat superior" and deprivations visited under
department. Id., 251 S.E.2d at 90.
32. Id. at 270, 251 S.E.2d at 91.
33. Id. at 271, 251 S.E.2d at 92 (Deen, P.J., dissenting).

34. Id. at 271-72, 251 S.E.2d at 92.
35. Id, at 270, 251 S.E.2d at 91.
36. Id. at 271, 251 S.E.2d at 91 (Deen, P.J., dissenting).
37. 250 Ga. 8, 295 S.E.2d 317 (1982).

38. Id. at 8, 295 S.E.2d at 318. Plaintiff alleged that the officer stopped him, detained
him for approximately an hour without charging him, and refused to allow his wife to
proceed to the hospital until an ambulance was called. Plaintiff's wife died at the hospital
some hours later. Id.
39. Id. at 10, 295 S.E.2d at 319. The trial court had rendered that judgment for the
municipality on the pleadings. Id. at 8, 295 S.E.2d at 318.
40. Id. at 9, 295 S.E.2d at 318. "The supremacy clause of the Constitution prevents us
from construing the federal rule to permit a state immunity defense." Id.
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governmental "policy or custom."
Police detention and delay, the
court concluded, may entitle plaintiff "to relief under some state of facts
involving the City ... which could be proved in support of his claim
under... Section 1983.42
Having postponed the day of reckoning to the day of proof, the
supreme court's Davis opinion shed little additional light."
Its
indicated receptiveness to the federal statute, as a viable limitation on
local government immunity, awaited future fruition.
Less than six months later, Baranan v. Fulton County" reflected a
far more thoughtful, and considerably more cautious, supreme court.
The plaintiff in Baranan employed Section 1983 to complain of the
county's "continuing nuisance" in diverting drainage water across his
land. That nuisance, plaintiff asserted, violated his rights under the
Fourth, Fifth, and Fourteenth Amendments to the Federal Constitution.45
The supreme court not only rejected plaintiff's position but also
tendered an original substantive analysis.' The court recognized that
county "nuisances" might precipitate eminent domain liability under the
Georgia Constitution.4 7 "This," however, "does not necessarily mean
that the same facts raise a valid cause of action under parallel provisions of the United States Constitution."4 True, the court conceded,
"[tihere is probably a potential federal constitutional issue in every suit
However, Section 1983 is not a
against the state or its agents."
"vehicle" for litigating "all simple tort suits (traditionally state protected
rights) as federal constitutional violations."5' Abuses of governmental
power do not raise "'ordinary tort[s]'" to the "'stature'" of constitutional

41. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 318-19. "In order to state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 the
plaintiff must allege that the defendant is a person who deprived him of a constitutional
right while acting under color of state law or custom." Id., 295 S.E.2d at 318.
42. Id., 295 S.E.2d at 319.
43. The three dissenting justices filed no written opinion. See id. at 10, 295 S.E.2d at
319.
44. 250 Ga. 531, 299 S.E.2d 722 (1983).
45, Id. at 532, 299 S.E.2d at 723-24. Plaintiff alleged the county's rerouting of the
surface waters across his property and the continuation of that practice until the date of
the litigation. Id. at 531, 299 S.E.2d at 723.
46. Id. at 532, 299 S.E.2d at 724.
47. Id.

48. Id. at 533, 299 S.E.2d at 724. The court observed that "the states may offer their
citizens greater protection through their own constitutions than is provided in the federal
constitution." Id.
49. Id.
50. Id., 299 S.E.2d at 724-25. This was true, the court reasoned, though "the broad
purpose of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 is to guarantee protection of federal rights." Id.
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violations."1 Affirming denial of plaintiff's claim, the court announced
its future resolve: "We do not intend to expand the scope of Section 1983
actions beyond the limits set forth by the federal courts." 2
In its initial substantive reflections upon Monell, therefore, the
Georgia Supreme Court revealed concerns on several fronts. One front
touched upon the delineation of similar rights assured by both state and
federal constitutions. The court appeared resolute in its refusal
automatically to embrace state violations as valid federal claims.
Moreover, the court manifested its determination to preserve traditional
distinctions between "simple tort suits" and "federal constitutional
violations." An ordinary tort, even one savoring of governmental abuse
and violative of the Georgia Constitution, failed to attain federal stature.
Federal decisions counseled against Monell's misuse,' and the Georgia
Supreme Court accepted (with demonstrative fervor) the counsel."
The supreme court's final decision of the "formative" epoch, City of
Cave Spring v. Mason,55 followed Barananby only a few months. Cave
Spring presented an action for malicious arrest and prosecution"M with
the court of appeals applying Section 1983 against the defendant
municipality.5 7 Granting certiorari, the supreme court proceeded to
"reconcile" the federal statute with Georgia's "traditional, constitutional,
and statutory doctrine of sovereign immunity.""8 That reconciliation
pivoted upon the court's analytical alarm over the "meaning of the terms
'acting under color of state law or custom.'" 9 On their face, those
terms would ensnare the conduct of "every servant, agent, or employee
of a governmental body, while in the course of employment.' ° Such a

51. Id., 299 S.E.2d at 724. The court relied upon, and quoted from, York u. City of
Cedartown, 648 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1981).

52. 250 Ga. at 533, 299 S.E.2d at 725.
53. Id., 299 S.E.2d at 724-25 (asserting that this was the message of York and the
United States Supreme Court decision in Parrattv. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).

54. Id.
55. 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d-892 (1984).
56. Id. at 3, 310 S.E.2d at 892. Defendant municipality and officials had structured a
.notice of charges" against plaintiff based on third-party reports of wrongful appropriation

of city water. The charges were subsequently dismissed. Id.
57. See Dawson v. Mason, 167 Ga. App. 129,305 S.E.2d 820 (1983), reu'dsub nom. City

of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 4, 310 S.E.2d 892, 894 (1984).
58. 252 Ga. at 4, 310 S.E.2d at 893. The clear message of Monell, the court asserted,
is that Section 1983 "assuredly ...

is not a federally imposed doctrine of respondeat

superior." Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. "'State law' is the progenitor of all public activity conducted within the bounds
of our Georgia Constitution; 'custom' is 'state action,' lacking the express direction of 'state

law,' and 'under color of is the equivalent of in pursuit of.'" Id.
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prospect, obviouslyincompatible with the orderly conduct of government,
mandated an exercise in judicial construction.
The court expressly "centered" upon "the nature of the 'state law or
custom' as formulated" by the local government's "policy-making
apparatus." 1 So focused, the interpretative exercise bypassed Monell's
analysis and ran exclusively to the federal statute itself: "We interpret
42 U.S.C. § 1983 to create a cause of action, cognizable by the courts of
this state, based upon acts which are in implementation of an intentional
policy, adopted or ratified by the governing body of a public agency,
which acts work deprivation of a constitutional right. 2 The requisite
"intentional policy," the court elaborated, "may be formal or informal,
acknowledged or vigorously denied, persistent or intermittent, or
implemented by but one single act. 6 In sum, future claimants must
prove "that a governing body has worked constitutional deprivation of a
citizen pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt policy which is
intentional and deliberate. 4 With Georgia's approach to Section 1983
finally formulated, the court remanded Cave Spring for appropriate
reconsideration.65
Six years removed from its inception, therefore, Monell's revolution
required adaptation to the traditional context of Georgia local government law. Proceeding under a self-announced theme of "reconciliation,"
and seemingly oblivious to Monell itself, the Georgia Supreme Court
imposed its own independent interpretation upon Section 1983.
Translating the statute's "policy or custom" concept into the parlance of
local government administration, the court envisioned action by the local
"governing body." That action need be neither formal nor continuous,
but it must intentionally yield an official "policy." The operative "intent"
thus referred not to deliberate deprivation of rights, but rather the local
government's adoption or ratification of policy as "policy." Finally, the

61.

l

The court defined that "apparatus" as "the appointed or elected members of the

several branches of state government, or the elected members of the governing body of a
county or municipality, or the appointed governing body of any other agency of state,

county, or municipal government." Id.
62. Id.
63. Id. at 4-5, 310 S.E.2d at 893.
64. Id. at 5, 310 S.E.2d at 894.
65. Id. In forceful dissent, a single justice insisted that under federal law "there is
clearly no requirement ... that conduct violative of the Constitution be either intentional

or formally adopted by the governing body of a public agency" and that "[a] reckless
disregard or indifference to violation of these rights, which need not amount to
implementation of an intentional policy, is sufficient." Id. at 7, 310 S.E.2d at 895 (Smith,
J., dissenting). The dissent continued: "No formula for misconduct need be shown by the
claimant, and no wilfulness or specific intent to deprive him or others of protected rights

is required." Id.
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governing body's "implementation" of that policy must actually cause the
complainant's deprivation. As thus "reconciled," Section 1983 created a
civil cause of action cognizable in Georgia courts.
The formative period appropriately concluded with the court of appeals
decision in City of College Park v. Grunden. *The case featured a
claim for damages to plaintiff's automobile while being towed by a
wrecker service operating under municipal 6ontract."7 Although
rejecting the claim, the trial court also denied the municipality's motion
for attorney fees." The city's appeal from that denial presented a
Section 1983 issue of first impression. 9
The majority opinion emphasized the municipality's burdens on the
70 defendant may recover attorney fees
issue. As "prevailing party,"
"only upon a showing that the plaintiff's action in filing the suit was
unreasonable, frivolous, meritless, or vexatious."71 Moreover, the trial
judge's discretion in deciding the issue "will not be upset unless
abused. 2
Against those burdens, however, the court posited Monell's requirement of injury "from the execution of an official governmental policy or
custom." 73 "Obviously," the court asserted, "it was not the city's official

policy or custom to cause towing damage to automobiles which had been
involved in collisions."74 Additionally, plaintiff had possessed "a full
and complete remedy against the towing company under simple tort
principles." 76 Accordingly, "[ulnder no construction could [plaintiff)
have prevailed against the city in the Section 1983 action," 8 and the

66. 171 Ga. App. 814, 321 S.E.2d 371 (1984).
67. Id. at 814, 321 S.E.2d at 372. Plaintiff's automobile was involved in an accident
inside the municipality, the municipal police officer summoned the "city wrecker," and the
wrecker allegedly caused further damage to the car while transporting it. Id.
68. Id.
69. Id.at 817, 321 S.E.2d at 374 (Benham, J., dissenting).
70. 42 U.S.C. § 1988(b) (1996): "In any action to enforce a provision of sections 1981(a),
1982, 1983, 1985, and 1986 of this title, ... the court, in its discretion, may allow the
prevailing party, other than the United States, a reasonable attorney's fee as part of the
costs.... "
71. 171 Ga. App. at 814,321 S.E.2d at 372 (relying upon Carrion v. Yeshiva Univ., 535
F.2d 722 (1976)).
72. Id,
73. Id. at 815, 321 S.E.2d at 372.
74. Id.
75. Id. "Indeed, the appellee was duly informed prior to filing this suit that the towing
company was an independent contractor and that it was fully insured." I&
76. Id.
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trial court had abused its discretion in denying municipal attorney
fees. 7
Grunden thus concluded the era upon a typically restrictive note.
First, the court sought official "policy or custom" by focusing upon
infliction of the damage rather than the governmental context producing
the damage. Thus, the municipal policy of towing wrecked automobiles
did not encompass damage to the towed vehicles. From this restrictive
vista, however, plaintiff will rarely prevail upon the policy issue. Few
municipalities, it seems safe to suggest, will decide upon a policy of
damaging automobiles. Second, the court maintained, plaintiff should
have appreciated the weakness of his policy claim and the strength of
his "simple tort" case against a third party. Indeed, plaintiff's dual
failures of appreciation constituted "unreasonable, frivolous, meritless,
or vexatious" conduct. Finally, the trial judge's failure to recognize this
conduct amounted to an abuse of discretion. With those conclusions, the
court of appeals also concluded a novel issue under Section 1983.
IV. GEORGIA: SETTLING IN
A.

The Middle Ages (1985-1990)
The supreme court opened Georgia's next round of Section 1983
8
jurisprudence with a return to City of Roswell v. Davis."
Davis
featured the claim that an inadequately trained police officer delayed
transportation of plaintiff's critically ill wife to a hospital.7" Rebuffing
the charge, the court could find no causal connection between the alleged
training deficiency and plaintiff's deprivation.' First, the crucial delay

77. Id. A dissenting opinion for two judges urged as follows:
The area of civil rights is still virgin territory for the appellate courts of this State,
and we should proceed with extreme caution in interpreting the civil rights
statutes using federal guidelines. Since this is a matter of first impression in this
court, the majority opinion may well have a 'chilling effect' on civil rights actions
and will pose a roadblock to the bringing of legitimate claims.
Id. at 817, 321 S.E.2d at 374 (Benham, J., dissenting).
78. 255 Ga. 158, 335 S.E.2d 582 (1985).
79. See Davis v. City of Roswell, 250 Ga. 8, 295 S.E.2d 317 (1982), supra text
accompanying notes 37-43. There, the court had concluded that plaintiff "may be entitled
to relief under some state of facts involving the City... which could be proved in support
of his claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id. at 9, 295 S.E.2d at 317.
80. 255 Ga. at 163, 335 S.E.2d at 586.
In sum, what the evidence as a whole shows is that a police officer legitimately

stopped a car only to discover that it bore a critically ill woman. He then decided
that, rather than allow the driver to proceed or to transport [the woman] in his

patrol car, the better course of action was to call for emergency help to render aid
and for an ambulance to transport the patient to the hospital, which was over 8
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resulted from extended ambulance response time, an occurrence the
evidence failed to show "that the officer should have anticipated."5 '
Second, the officer promptly called his supervisor whose immediate
arrival on the scene broke "the causal link" between the officer's training
and plaintiff's harm."2 In sum, the court concluded, "[w]e find that the
evidence did not establish that a 'policy' of inadequate training sufficient
to support liability under... [Section] 1983 was the cause of the harm
suffered by [plaintiffl.""
Tort law's venerable "causation" requirement, Davis revealed, occupies
a universal presence. It perpetuates that presence, moreover, in both its
"cause in fact" and "proximate cause" doctrinal attires. In both guises,
the requirement reaches beyond the boundaries of negligence law to
dominate the theater of "constitutional torts" as well.
Davis aside, it was at this early juncture that the "transitional era"
radiated a marked transfer of judicial responsibility. Increasingly, the
supreme court found fewer and fewer occasions for deciding Section 1983
controversies. For extended periods, therefore, continued evolution fell
largely to the Georgia Court of Appeals. That court, in a myriad of
litigated contexts, confronted the statute's unfolding assault upon local
government tort immunity.
The statute's "policy or custom" component proved a persistently
problematic item for the court. It operated across an illustrative span
of judicially perceived governmental scenarios. First, there is the
instance in which the court perceives claimant's failure to establish any
local government policy or custom. This was the court's view of
Dinsmore v. Cherokee County," a wrongful death action for a collapsing
wall at the county landfill.85 Once it sustained dismissal of plaintiff's

miles away. In addition, he called a supervising officer to the scene as he had
been instructed to do ....
[Plaintiff] bore the burden of showing not only the
existence of an official policy of inadequate medical emergency training, but also

a causal connection between the policy and the constitutional deprivation.

Id.
81. Id. "Liability was not predicated on the response time of these personnel but on
alleged inadequate training because of which the officer allegedly mishandled the
emergency." Id.

82. Id.
83. Id. at 164, 335 S.E.2d at 586. The court thus reversed the court of appeals decision
in Davis v. Ramey, 174 Ga. App. 417, 330 S.E.2d 130 (1985), and affirmed the trial cour's
grant of the municipality's motion for j.n.o.v. Id. Only one justice dissented, without
opinion. See id.

84. 177 Ga. App. 93, 338 S.E.2d 523 (1985).
85. Id. at 93, 338 S.E.2d at 524. Plaintiff's decedent was dumping rubbish at the
county landfill and was killed when the dirt wall to the waste trench caved in. Id.
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negligence count,"6 the court could, discern no remaining basis for
Section 1983:87 "The alleged operative facts hardly qualify as an
implementation of an intentional policy or a constitutional deprivation
resulting from an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy.' The
larger thus included the lesser: in the absence of any established
landfill policy, necessarily there was none substantiating a constitutional
tort claim. Noticeably, the court failed to extract a deficient "policy"
from the county's policy of formulating "no policy" in operating its
landfill.
In a second instance, claimant's evidence apparently reveals a
governmental policy, but the court refuses to credit the revelation. In
City of Marietta v. Kelly,89 an action for illegal arrest, the arresting
officer testified "that the practice of placing shoplifting suspects under
arrest in lieu of the complainant securing a city warrant for shoplifting
was the police department's 'routine procedure. ' "9° Reversing claimant's summary judgment, the court found "no evidence conclusively
showing that such arrest'was pursuant to any official [municipal] policy
or custom."9 1 On the one hand, "routine procedure" existed; on the
other hand, "official policy" was lacking.
A third, and substantial, variation completes the circle. The setting
is one in which the court finds governmental policy but also expressly
approves it. Mills v. City of Atlanta 2 featured plaintiff's collision with
a police officer responding to an emergency.93 As for policy, the city
tendered its instructions to police trainees on statutory requirements for
operating emergency vehicles., The court plumbed the substantive

86. Id., 338 S.E.2d at 523-24. The court rejected plaintiff's attempt to use provisions
of the Georgia Solid Waste Management Act (O.C.G.A. § 12-8-1 to -52.2 (1996 & Supp.
1997)) to show negligence, finding no statutory authorization for a negligence action based
on a breach of duty. Id.
87. Id. at 94, 338 S.E.2d at 525. "In the instant case, the unmistakable gravamen of
the appellants' complaint was negligence." Id.
88. Id. The court relied upon the supreme court's formulation in Cave Spring. Id.
89. 175 Ga. App. 416, 334 S.E.2d 6 (1985).
90. Id. at 418, 334 S.E.2d at 9.
91. Id. A dissenting opinion forcefully differed on the custom or policy issue: "[Tihe
only evidence of that issue" is the officer's testimony, and "[i]t is clear, therefore, that the
liability here does not stem from the activity of a single city employee but from an
established practice." Id. (Benham, J., dissenting).
92. 175 Ga. App. 8, 332 S.E.2d 319 (1985).
93. Id. at 8, 332 S.E.2d at 320. Although the officer was treating the call as an
emergency, the evidence conflicted as to whether she was using both her emergency lights
and siren. Id.
94. Id. at 9, 332 S.E.2d at 321.
The record establishes that the city instructed its police trainees as follows with
regard to the meaning of the statute [O.C.G.A. § 40-6-6 (1997)]: "These
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accuracy of those instructions and characterized them "an acceptable
interpretation of the statute.9 Consequently, "the city satisfactorily
negated the essential allegations of [plaintiff's] Section 1983 claim.'
Local government "policy" thus clearly existed; it received, however, the
court's express analytical endorsement as valid governmental operation.
The statute's "deprivation" component97 likewise proved troublesome
for the court of appeals. In an assortment of contexts, Section 1983
claimants discovered, this component barred their way.
The court touched upon the deprivation issue in City of Marietta v.
Kelly,9" an action for illegal arrest. There, focusing upon events related
to the arrest," the court preliminarily observed that "[vliolation of state
law alone does not give rise to an action under Section 1 9 8 3 ."'00
Although plaintiff's arrest "involved a failure to fully comply with
Georgia law," this "does not necessarily imply a deprivation of federal
constitutional rights."' Reversing claimant's summary judgment, the
court emphasized conflicting evidence on whether a probable cause
determination could have been obtained during claimant's warrantless
detention." 2 If not, the court reasoned, "it does not follow that a
deprivation of federal constitutional rights occurred."'

exemptions can be used when answering an emergency or when pursuing a
suspect. The law says that you can use these exemptions-but-you had better
not become involved in an accident. If you are involved in an accident, be ready
to justify your actions well enough that twelve (12) citizens (not police officers) will
be convinced that: (1) an emergency actually existed and (2) that you used due
regard for the safety of others. You have to prove both."
Id.
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
98. 175 Ga. App. 416, 334 S.E.2d 6 (1985).
99. Id. at 416, 334 S.E.2d at 7. Plaintiff had been arrested for shoplifting under an
invalid warrant. Id.
100. Id.
101. Id.
102. Id. at 416-17, 334 S.E.2d at 8. "As incident to a lawful arrest without a warrant
the arrestee may be held for a reasonable time pending a judicial determination of probable
cause." Id. at 418, 334 S.E.2d at 9.
103. Id. For yet another, and later, court of appeali analysis along these lines, see
Jarrettv. Butts, 190 Ga. App. 703, 379 S.E.2d 583 (1989), pertaining to a student's action
against a county school board for a teacher's having photographed plaintiff against her will.
Id. at 703-04, 379 S.E.2d at 584-85. The court rejected plaintiffs claim under Section 1983
for violation of her right to privacy as protected by the Federal Constitution. Id. at 705,
379 S.E.2d at 586. The court reasoned as follows:
We find no authority for (plaintiffs] assertions that the alleged invasion of privacy
at issue here is encompassed within the "fundamental," personal rights "implicit
in the concept of ordered liberty," that are included within the zone of privacy
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Deprivation likewise foreclosed plaintiff's effort in Evans v. Clayton

County" to recover for injuries inflicted by a dog released from the

county pound.0 5 The release, the court emphasized, followed the
county's "good faith" determination that the dog was not vicious and
assurances that the adopting owner possessed proper facilities." e
Under no circumstances, the court implied, could the evidence show
more than county negligence. "Where a government official's act
causing injury to life, liberty or property is merely negligent, "no
procedure for compensation is constitutionally required.'" 10 7 Accordingly, "plaintiff has no basis for any recovery pursuant to... [Section]
1983. "o"° As with "mere" violations of state law, so with "mere"
negligence, the statute's "deprivation" hurdle proved insurmountable.
Could the governmental immunity doctrine itself sufficiently "deprive?" This issue surfaced in Sisson v. Douglas County School
District,'" a student's action for injuries incurred in a fall on school
premises." Essentially, plaintiff contended, "he was denied a property right without due process of law, because under Georgia law 'no state
remedy exists' for a party injured by the acts of a county employee.""'
In response, the court disputed plaintiff's premise rather than his
conclusion. Recognizing a cause of action as "property protected by the
Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause,"" 2 the court nevertheless
deemed "the states ... free to create substantive defenses or 'immuni-

guaranteed by the United States Constitution ....
Other than the rights
protected by specific amendments ... , "the protection of a person's general right
to privacy-[her] right to be let alone by other people-is... left largely to the
law of the individual States."
Id. at 706-07, 379 S.E.2d at 587 (quoting Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 152 (1973); Katz v.
United States, 389 U.S. 347,350 (1967); and Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479,483-85
(1965)). Once again, therefore, a violation of state law, if there was such a violation, did
not constitute a sufficient "deprivation" under Section 1983.
104. 182 Ga. App. 613, 356 S.E.2d 553 (1987).
105. Id. at 613, 356 S.E.2d at 553. Plaintiff alleged the county's "'corrupt and
negligent' policy of releasing vicious dogs to their owners or others rather than destroying
them." Id. at 613-14, 356 S.E.2d at 553.
106. Id. at 614,356 S.E.2d at 553-54. The evidence, the court reasoned, "unequivocally"
established these circumstances. Id., 356 S.E.2d at 553.
107. Id. (quoting Daniels v. Williams, 474 U.S. 327, 333 (1986)).
108. Id. The court thus affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment in favor
of the county. Id., 356 S.E.2d at 554.
109. 181 Ga. App. 77, 351 S.E.2d 272 (1986).
110. Id. at 77-78, 351 S.E.2d at 272-73. Plaintiff alleged various acts and failures to
act resulting in his fall on a rain-slicked gymnasium floor. Id
111. Id. at 80, 351 S.E.2d at 274.
112. Id (relying upon Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422 (1982)).
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ties.'"'1 The Georgia legislature "has provided due process of law in
its consideration of potential claims during enactment of the state's
overall tort scheme of law."14 Any resulting immunities, the court
maintained, could scarcely qualify as fatal deprivations. "[N]o segment
of the Fourteenth Amendment's due process clause.., protects against
all deprivations of life, liberty, or property by the State.""5 Consequently, plaintiff had suffered "no deprivation of any constitutional right
...

without due process of law.""

There are deprivations, it turns

out, and there are Section 1983 "deprivations."
A remaining variation on the concept emerged in Henderson v.
Sherrington,"7 an action for the county's termination of plaintiff's
employment. Having obtained reinstatement and back pay, plaintiff
appealed denial of her Section 1983 claim for damages." 8 Upon
review, the court of appeals delineated plaintiff's alleged due process
violations." 9
Adequate state remedies satisfied procedural due
process, and "the adequacy of the state remedy.., has been conclusively
established by the fact that it resulted in [plaintiff's] reinstatement with
back pay and benefits." 20 Although those results may not equal the
relief that Section 1983 would have afforded, they nevertheless
precluded the federal claim.' 2 ' As for substantive due process, "'[Nbot
every wrong committed by a state actor rises to the level of a "constitutional tort."'""2 Indeed, "an administrative or personnel action of
[this] type," the court held, "cannot be considered so brutal or shocking
as to constitute a substantive due process violation. " " On both
deprivation fronts, therefore, plaintiff's Section 1983 efforts proved
futile.'2 '
Aside from the substantive impediments, Section 1983 claimants also
confronted litigation time bars. The constitutional violations charged in

113. Id.
114. Id., 351 S.E.2d at 275.

115. Id.
116. Id. at 81,351 S.E.2d at 275. The court affirmed the trial court's grant of summary
judgment for the county school district. Id.
117. 189 Ga. App. 498, 376 S.E.2d 397 (1988).
118. Id. at 498, 376 S.E.2d at 398. The termination resulted from the abolition of
plaintiff's position, the position of county tag agent, which the plaintiff had held for 19

years. Id.
119. Id. at 499, 376 S.E.2d at 398-99.

120. Id., 376 S.E.2d at 399 (relying on Parratt v. Taylor, 451 U.S. 527 (1981)).
121. Id. (relying on Parratt, 451 U.S. 527).
122. Id. (quoting Lee v. Hudson, 810 F.2d 1030, 1032 (11th Cir. 1987)).
123. I& at 500, 376 S.E.2d at 399.
124. The court thus affirmed the trial court's summary judgment denying plaintiffs

Section 1983 claim for damages. Id.
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Freeman v. City of Brunswick125 indisputably occurred more than two
years prior to plaintiffs complaint. 126 For that reason, the court
summarily dismissed the action: "Even viewing plaintiffs claim as
arising under ... [Section] 1983, the applicable statute of limitation
remains the two-year period provided by [the Georgia statute]." 7
Notably, the "transition era" was not completely bereft of claimant
success. City of Athens v. McGahee"1 featured a complaint by police
officers to the repeal of retirement benefits."2 Alluding to both state
and federal decisional guidelines, the court of appeals approved the
claimants' efforts." 0 First, the court found both an "intentional
3 and an interest "safeguarded by procedural due
[municipal] policy"3'
132
process."
Moreover, the court reasoned, "by virtue of its charter, and
its governing authority thereunder," the city obviously acted under "color
of state law." 3 Finally, the court concluded, "the benefits sought by
plaintiffs were of a class of property protected against arbitrary and
unilateral cancellation without cause by the city, and the city's action in
attempting to do so created a cause of action under ... [Section)
1983. "134
Georgia's transitional evolution of Section 1983 thus continued the
expositional themes of caution and reconciliation. Although claimants
continued their press for constitutional tort responsibility, the state's
heritage of local government immunity loomed large. A meshing of those

125. 193 Ga. App. 635, 388 S.E.2d 746 (1989). Plaintiff alleged violations of due
process, equal protection, and illegal search and seizure. He had been arrested for
possession of illegal drugs. Id. at 635, 388 S.E.2d at 747.
126. Id. The events occurred in 1985, and the complaint was filed in 1988. Id.
127. Id. at 635-36, 388 S.E.2d at 747 (relying on O.C.G.A. § 9-3-33 (1982)). The court
thus affirmed the trial court's grant of summary judgment for the municipality. Id. at 636,
388 S.E.2d at 747.
128. 178 Ga. App. 76, 341 S.E.2d 855 (1986).
129. Id. at 76-77, 341 S.E.2d at 856. The plan provided for severance pay upon
retirement, based on number of years of service, and all plaintiff police officers had
obtained at least the minimum service time when the plan was repealed. The plan had
been adopted in 1970 and was then repealed in 1980. Id.
130. Id. at 80, 341 S.E.2d at 859.
131. Id. at 79, 341 S.E.2d at 858. The court extracted this guideline from the Georgia
Supreme Court decision in City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d 892 (1984).
178 Ga. App. at 79, 341 S.E.2d at 858.
132. 178 Ga. App. at 79, 341 S.E.2d at 858. The court extracted this guideline from the
United States Supreme Court decision in Board of Regents of State Colleges v. Roth, 408
U.S. 564 (1972). 178 Ga. App. at 79, 341 S.E.2d at 858.
133. 178 Ga. App. at 79-80, 341 S.E.2d at 858-59. The court extracted this guideline
from the United States Supreme Court decision in Lugar v. Edmondson Oil Co., 457 U.S.
922 (1982). 178 Ga. App. at 79, 341 S.E.2d at 858.
134. 178 Ga. App. at 80, 341 S.E.2d at 859.

1997]

LOCAL GOV'T & CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

19

concepts proved a delicate judicial undertaking. The Georgia Supreme
Court, early fashioning a doctrinal prerequisite of causation, promptly
entrusted the era to the Georgia Court of Appeals. That court subjected
Section 1983 claimants to obstacles of policy or custom, deprivation,
adequate state remedies, and statutory time limitations. It was a rare
plaintiff who successfully maneuvered this maze of litigational impediments.
The era's conclusion, however, left the distinct impression that
Georgia's appellate courts were yet to confront the full brunt of the
Monell progeny. The dawn of a new decade promptly and conclusively
projected that impression to full fruition.

B. The Modern Touch (1990-1997)
Perhaps the modern era's most impressive feature is sheer volume of
Section 1983 litigation against local governments. Unpromising
background to the contrary, constitutional tort quests abound in the
Georgia appellate courts.

1.

The Georgia Supreme Court. Although perpetuating its

developmental deference to the court of appeals, the Georgia Supreme
Court periodically reappears upon the evolutionary scene. At the
decade's inception, the court decided City of Atlanta v. JA. Jones
Construction Co.,' a lowest timely bidder's challenge to municipal
acceptance of a late construction bid.13 Plaintiff sued the city under
state law for lost profits and under Section 1983 for denial of due
process. The latter claim targeted the municipality's failure to afford
plaintiff a protest hearing. At trial plaintiff received a jury verdict and
judgment on both counts, victories subsequently affirmed by the court
of appeals.137
Granting certiorari only "to consider the measure of damages,""s the
supreme court first formulated "the purpose of the bid requirement"'39
as "protect[ing] the public coffers from waste" and "assur[ing] that
taxpayers receive quality work and goods for the lowest possible

135. 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
136. Id. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370. "The deadline for submitting bids was set at 2:00
p.m., April 10, 1985. Appellees' bid was the lowest timely bid submitted, but the contract
was awarded to Interstate Construction, whose bid was lower but was submitted three
minutes after the 2:00 p.m. deadline.' Id.
137. City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 195 Ga. App. 72, 392 S.E.2d 564 (1990).
138. 260 Ga. at 658, 398 S.E.2d at 370.
139. Id.
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price.""4 Municipal frustration of that purpose deprived plaintiff of
the contract, and "the permissible recovery for that wrong is the
reasonable expense of bid preparation.""" Because plaintiff having
recovered those expenses under state law, "the award based on the
Section 1983 claim constituted an impermissible double recovery.""
Its concern in JA. Jones Construction Co. focused exclusively on
damages, the supreme court took no issue with the finding of a Section
1983 "wrong" itself. The protections peculiar origin did, however, limit
the worth of the harm inflicted. The court adopted that limitation from
the United States Supreme Court: "'[Tihe abstract value of a constitutional right may not form the basis of Section 1983 damages ....[Sluch
damages must always be designed "to compensate injuriescaused by the
constitutional deprivation."'"'" Yet another inhibition thus levied its
toll upon the Monell progeny in Georgia's Section 1983 jurisprudence.
By 1992, the supreme court was prepared explicitly to articulate its
philosophy of restricted review. In Kroupa v. Cobb County,'" the court
instructed that jurisdiction of Section 1983 appeals "generally lies in the
Court of Appeals.""' This was "because such claims ordinarily involve
the application of unquestioned and unambiguous provisions of the state
Hereafter, the court advised future
or federal constitutions.""
litigants, "unless jurisdiction lies in this court for some other reason,

140. Id. "Approval of a process which favors the acceptance of the lowest bid is a
constant theme expressed in cases decided by this court.... Id.
141. Id. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 371. Those expenses were the sole items recoverable
under the state law claim.
[W]e adopt the reasoning of S & W Mechanical Co. v. City of Homerville, 682 F.

Supp. 546 (M.D. Ga. 1988), and specifically disallow the recovery of lost profits.
To permit the recovery of lost profits would unduly punish the tax-paying public

while compensating the plaintiffs for effort they did not make and risks they did
not take.

260 Ga. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 370.
142. 260 Ga. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 371. The court expressly relied on Memphis
Community School District v. Stachura, 477 U.S. 299 (1986). Two justices dissented in
separate opinions. 260 Ga. at 661-65, 398 S.E.2d at 372-74.
143. 260 Ga. at 659, 398 S.E.2d at 371 (quoting Memphis Community Sch. Dist. v.
Stachura, 477 U.S. 299, 308-09 (1986)).

144. 262 Ga. 451, 421 S.E.2d 283 (1992).
145. Id. at 452, 421 S.E.2d at 284. In Kroupa the court summarily dismissed a Section
1983 claim against county police officers who investigated plaintiffs traffic accident and
gave her a ticket: "The trial court properly granted summary judgment to the defendants
because none of [plaintiffs] allegations, even if true, shows a deprivation of any rights
secured under 42 U.S.C. § 1983." Id.
146. Id.

1997]

LOCAL GOV'T & CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS

21

appeals raising claims under... [Section] 1983 should be filed in the
Court of Appeals."'4 v
Following Kroupa's admonition, four years elapsed before the supreme
court's first significant reentry upon Georgia's Section 1983 anthology.
In Atlanta City School District v. Dowling,"4 the court granted certiorari to review the municipal school system's termination of an employee.
The issue was whether plaintiff's Section 1983 claim survived her "reinstate[ment] in her job with back pay as a result of state remedies."'4 9
In response, the court fashioned the following delineation: "Unlike a
substantive due process claim, a constitutional violation of procedural
due process is not complete 'unless and until the State fails to provide
due process. ' "1" Thus, "'the state may cure a procedural deprivation
by providing a later procedural remedy.'"' 5 '
This claimant had
received both administrative and judicial review, and "the trial court
granted the equitable relief... sought." 5" That disposition provided
"an adequate remedy under state law""'5 and "redressed any procedural due process deprivations that [plaintiffi suffered." "' Consequently,
the court dismissed plaintiff's Section 1983 claim for damages.'
In summary, the supreme court's current treatment of Section 1983 is
both limited and limiting. In ordinary instances, the court cautions
statutory litigants, it will not render appellate review. " True to its
counsel, the court granted certiorari in only two significant instances
within the last six years. It utilized both occasions, moreover, to
emphasize restrictions inherent in a Section 1983 proceeding. First, the
protected claim avails only for compensating concrete injuries. Once
state law renders that compensation, Section 1983 offers no additional

147.
148.
149.

Id.
266 Ga. 217, 466 S.E.2d 588 (1996).
Id. at 217, 466 S.E.2d at 589.

150. Id. (quoting Zinermon v. Burch, 494 U.S. 113, 126 (1990)).
151. Id. (quoting McKinney v. Pate, 20 F.3d 1550, 1557 (11th Cir.), cert. denied, 513
U.S. 1110 (1994)).

152. Id. at 219, 466 S.E.2d at 590. "On administrative review, the State Board of
Education reversed the Atlanta board's decision to dismiss [plaintiff]. Finally, the trial
court granted the equitable relief that [plaintiff] sought; it ordered the Atlanta school board
to reinstate [plaintiff) as general manager and awarded her full back pay and benefits."

Id.
153. Id. at 218, 466 S.E.2d at 590.
154.
155.
appeals,
156.

Id. at 217, 466 S.E.2d at 590.
Id. at 219, 466 S.E.2d at 590. The supreme court decision reversed the court of
Dowling v. Atlanta City School District, 216 Ga. App. 688, 455 S.E.2d 399 (1995).
See Kroupa v. Cobb County, 262 Ga. 451, 421 S.E.2d 283 (1992).
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balm for "the abstract value of a constitutional right."157 Second, when
based upon a procedural deprivation, a Section 1983 claim exists subject
to subsequent state-law correction. Once adequately effected, the
correction precludes an additional award of damages under Section
1983.158

Most Section 1983 evolution presently occurs in the Georgia Court of
Appeals.
2. The Georgia Court of Appeals. The court of appeals' current
treatment of Section 1983 litigation can be viewed in several subjectmatter composites. Some are common to earlier discussion; some
present novel issues.
a. Procedure. At the decade's inception, the court took Allen v.
Bergman 5 9 as the opportunity to announce a procedural correction.
There, focusing upon a teacher's handicap discrimination complaint
against the county school board, the court declared immaterial the
teacher's failure to exhaust her administrative remedies. The court
explained that two years earlier, the United States Supreme Court "held
that states may no longer require litigants to exhaust administrative
remedies before asserting [Section 19831 claims .. . in state courts. "lso
An obstacle of considerable difficulty thus disappeared from the
procedural path of Section 1983 claimants in Georgia courts.' 1
The court likewise freed Section 1983 claimants from Georgia's "ante
litem notice" mandate. 62 That statute requires plaintiffs seeking
damages from municipalities to furnish notice of claim within six months
of the injury's occurrence."s In City of Atlanta v. JA. Jones Construc-

157.

City of Atlanta v. JA. Jones Constr. Co., 260 Ga. 658, 659, 398 S.E.2d 369, 371

(1990).
158. Atlanta City Sch. Dist. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217, 466 S.E.2d 588 (1996).
159.

198 Ga. App. 57, 400 S.E.2d 347 (1990).

160. Id. at 58, 400 S.E.2d at 348-49. Plaintiff complained of termination upon refusing
to teach in another county school for the next academic year. Id., 400 S.E.2d at 348.
161. The court relied on Felder u. Casey, 487 U.S. 131 (1988), quoting from that
decision as follows:
"Given the evil at which the federal civil rights legislation was aimed, there is
simply no reason to suppose that Congress meant to provide these individuals

immediate access to the federal courts notwithstanding any provision of state law
to the contrary, yet contemplated that those who sought to vindicate their federal
rights in state courts could be required to seek redress in the first instance from
the very state officials whose hostility to those rights precipitated their injuries."
198 Ga. App. at 57, 400 S.E.2d at 349 (quoting Felder,487 U.S. at 147).
162. O.C.G.A. § 36-33-5 (1993).
163. Id. The statute requires the notice prior to plaintiffs filing suit against the
municipality. Id.
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tion Co.," the court simply pronounced the notice requirement
inapplicable to -claimant's "[Section] 1983 count."'
Two years later,
in Armour v. Davidson,'" the court reemphasized the point: "[Tihe
trial court erred in holding that plaintiff's action against the City is
barred by plaintiff's failure to give ante litem notice pursuant to
[statute]." 6 7 Again, "the notice provisions of that statute do not apply
to actions filed pursuant to... [Section] 1983."'6

b. Policy or Custom. "Policy or custom" continues as the most
problematic prerequisite for Section 1983 claimants in the Georgia
courts. Currently, the issue arises across the spectrum of local
government law enforcement activities. Pinkston v. City of Albany"s
illustrated the matter at the threshold activity of arrest.7 There, the
court summarily dismissed the claim of one who "by [his] own statement,
...was at a fire in a public place, with alcohol, displaying a weapon,
and ... refused to put out the fire."171 The court deemed it sufficient
to emphasize that claimant "has not even alleged that any of the
asserted wrongs committed against him resulted from the enforcement
or implementation of an intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy on
the part of the city."' 72
Striving to craft the essential charge, claimant in Armour v. Davidson17 alleged it "the custom of the City to allow for warrantless arrest
and then to detain the arrestee for a period of time until a warrant can
be obtained."7 4 However, when the municipality denied the alleged

164.

195 Ga. App. 72, 392 S.E.2d 564 (1990), reu'd on other grounds, 260 Ga. 658, 398

S.E.2d 369 (1990), cert. denied, 500 U.S. 928 (1991).
165. 195 Ga. App. at 78, 392 S.E.2d at 570.
166. 203 Ga. App. 12, 416 S.E.2d 92 (1992).
167. Id. at 12, 416 S.E.2d at 93.
168. Id.
169. 196 Ga. App. 43, 395 S.E.2d 587 (1990).
170. Id. at 43-44, 395 S.E.2d at 588. Municipal police officers had taken plaintiff into
protective custody and ultimately charged him with "disorderly while intoxicated," a charge
eventually nolle prossed. Id.
171. Id. at 46,395 S.E.2d at 590. Plaintiff had sued the municipality and its employees
for false arrest, slander, false imprisonment, and violation of his federal civil rights. Id.
at 44, 395 S.E.2d at 588.
172. Id.at 47, 395 S.E.2d at 590 (emphasis added). "It follows that he has asserted no
basis for a recovery of damages against the city, with the result that the city was properly
granted summary judgment." Id. The court cited for authority the United States Supreme
Court decision in Monell and the Georgia Supreme Court decision in City of Cave Spring.
Id.
173. 203 Ga. App. 12, 416 S.E.2d 92 (1992).
174. Id. at 13, 416 S.E.2d at 93.
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custom and moved for summary judgment,'75 the court held claimant
failed to meet his burden by filing an "affidavit only alleg[ing] proof of
a single incident of errant behavior." 7 Under the policy or custom
constitute a sufficient basis for
requirement, the affidavit "cannot
177
imposing liability on the City."
The court tendered a similar analysis in Bell v. City of Albany, 178 an
arrestee's claim for injuries suffered while intoxicated and struggling
with an officer at the police station. 179 Claimant asserted a municipal
policy authorizing the use of excessive force and "permitting a single
police officer to handle and escort highly intoxicated and handcuffed
arrestees despite a high risk of injury to the arrestee."'1 Once again,
however, plaintiff's only supporting evidence was that of his own injury
while struggling with "a non-policymaking employee of the City."''
The court denied Section 1983 liability "for a single incident of unconstitutional conduct by a municipal employee without proof that the conduct
was taken pursuant to a municipal policy or custom.""2 The court
stressed the paucity of evidence on excessive force, on injuriously
handling intoxicated arrestees, and on other similar instances. 18

175. Id. at 12, 416 S.E.2d at 93. The municipality submitted an affidavit by its City
Manager to the effect that the city's policy was to comply with the arrest requirements of
the Fourth Amendment and that "this policy is made known to all police officers who are
trained in said policy and expected to abide therewith." Id. at 13, 416 S.E.2d at 93
(citations omitted).
176. Id.
To meet its burden of showing such a policy, when the municipality has moved for
summary judgment on the basis that the City has no such custom or policy, the
plaintiff must allege a "series of incidents of unconstitutional conduct suggesting
'the existence of a widespread practice that ...constitute[s] a "custom or usage"
with the force of law.'"
Id. (quoting City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112, 127 (1988)).
177. Id.
178. 210 Ga. App. 371, 436 S.E.2d 87 (1993).
179. Id. at 371-72, 436 S.E.2d at 89. The injury occurred as the officer attempted to
walk the intoxicated plaintiff from the booking station to the adjacent jail when plaintiff
suddenly resisted and struggled with the officer, resulting in a fall through the open
doorway. Id.
180. Id. at 372-73, 436 S.E.2d at 90.
181. Id. at 373, 436 S.E.2d at 90.
182. Id. The court distinguished instances in which "a single decision by municipal
policymakers, or a single implementation of a municipal policy or custom by a municipal
employee, may be sufficient to establish that a municipal policy or custom caused the
alleged deprivation." Id. The court relied upon Pembaur v.Cincinnati, 475 U.S. 469
(1986). 210 Ga. App. at 373, 436 S.E.2d at 90.
183. 210 Ga. App. at 373,436 S.E.2d at 90. The court said that nothing suggested"any
widespread informal policy or practice constituting a custom or usage with the force of
law." Id. (citing City of St. Louis v. Praprotnik, 485 U.S. 112 (1988)).
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Rather, "[tihe evidence showed that City police officers received
appropriate training in dealing with intoxicated arrestees" and
authorized summary judgment."14

The policy issue may also attach prior to the arrest, as in Poss u. City
of North Augusta.'" There, decedents were killed in a car wreck while
being pursued by municipal police for various illegal acts." Summarily rejecting plaintiffs' Section 1983 complaint,8 7 the court found it
"undisputed that each [municipality] had promulgated guidelines which
defined and regulated the circumstances and manner under which a
high speed chase would be authorized.""'4 The court declared "[tihe

184. Id. "'[Ilnadequate training of police officers [can] be characterized as the cause
of the constitutional tort if-and only if-the failure to train amounted to deliberate
indifference to the rights of persons with whom the police come into contact.'" Id. (quoting
Collins v. Harker Heights, 503 U.S. 115, 123-24 (1992)). Said the Georgia Court of
Appeals: "Even assuming that there was evidence to support a factual issue as to whether
the training was completely adequate, there was certainly no evidence of a failure to train
amounting to deliberate indifferanee. Id
In a case similarly involving a ailhouse occurrence," Alford v. Osei-Kwasi, 203 Ga. App.
716, 418 S.E.2d 79 (1992), a county police officer subdued a prisoner by shooting her with
a taser. Id. at 716, 418 S.E.2d at 80-81. Summarily disposing of the Section 1983 claim
against the county, the court reasoned that "'[tjhe record is barren of any evidence of
"implementation of an intentional policy or a constitutional deprivation resulting from an
intentionally corrupt or impermissible policy" so as to find a cause of action under 42
U.S.C. § 1983.'" Id. at 722,418 S.E.2d at 85 (quoting Holloway v. Rogers, 181 Ga. App. 11,
13, 351 S.E.2d 240, 243 (1986)).
Finally, Watson u.Mayor ofSavannah, 223 Ga. App. 399,477 S.E.2d 667 (1996), featured
an action for injuries suffered by plaintiff in an altercation with an off-duty police officer.
Id at 399, 477 S.E.2d at 668. Sustaining the trial court's grant of summary judgment for
the municipality, the court reasoned as follows:
Pretermitting the issue of whether or not the trial court correctly found that [the
officer] was acting under color of law, there is simply no evidence in the record
sufficient to show that [the officer's] off-duty altercation with [plaintiff] ... was
the result of an impermissible or corrupt policy which was intentional and
deliberate.
Id. at 402, 477 S.E.2d at 670.
185. 205 Ga. App. 894, 424 S.E.2d 73 (1992).
186. 1l at 895, 424 S.E.2d at 73-74. Plaintiff's decedent was riding in the car driven
by an underage friend that was being chased by municipal police officers from two states
when the driver lost control and crashed. The Section 1983 wrongful death action was
brought against the police officers of both municipalities. Id.
187. Id., 424 S.E.2d at 74. "In order to state a claim pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983,
however, it is necessary to allege that the plaintiff was deprived of a constitutional right
by one who was acting under color of state law or custom." Id.
188. Id.
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very existence of these regulations ... to rebut any unsubstantiated
allegation" of authorized unconstitutional conduct.'"o
The court followed its decision in Poss in yet another high-speed chase
1
scenario, Tiliman v. Mastin.
' In Tillman plaintiff sued for a death
arising from decedent's collision with a county police officer responding
to an emergency call."9 ' Sustaining the county's summary judgment,
the court emphasized the absence of "a showing that [the] County
intentionally or deliberately promulgated or even tolerated an impermissible or corrupt policy in its training of police officers."'"
Clearly, Section 1983's "policy or custom" prerequisite renders the bar
of summary judgment a considerable hurdle for Georgia claimants.
Conspicuously, therefore, Mayor of Savannah v. Wilson""' encompasses
a notable instance of success on the issue. The case featured claimants'
charges of unconstitutional municipal arrest procedures. The city
countered with its motion for summary judgment, asserting insufficient
evidence of policy or custom.'
Preliminarily, the court of appeals
framed the issue as follows:
If the municipality's failure to train its employees demonstrates a
"deliberate indifference" to the rights of its inhabitants, as where a
deliberate choice is made to follow a course of action from among
various alternatives, then it can be thought of as a "policy or custom"
and municipal liability attaches.'"
Proceeding then to delineate claimants' respective circumstances, the
court held each to successfully surmount summary judgment.'"

One of the claimants asserted a municipal policy bf madng warrat-

less arrests and of a conscious indifference by failing "to promulgate a
written policy to guide police officers in making warrantless arrests."'"
To substantiate the assertion, claimant produced "uncontroverted

189. Id. The court thus sustained the trial judge's grant of summary judgment for the
municipalities. Id.
190. 216 Ga. App. 3, 453 S.E.2d 85 (1994).
191. Id. at 3, 453 S.E.2d at 86. Decedent was attempting to make a left turn off a
highway when struck by the officer responding to a "crime in progress" call. I&
192. Id. at 4, 453 S.E.2d at 87.
193. 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994).
194. Id. at 171, 447 S.E.2d at 126. One claimant alleged arrest without warrant for
robbery of a pharmacy and detention for sixty-six hours. The other claimant alleged
conviction for a robbery to which another person later confessed, a person who was being
investigated for the robbery prior to claimant's accusation. Id. at 170-71, 447 S.E.2d at
126.
195. Id. (citing City of Canton v. Harris, 489 U.S. 378 (1989)).
196. 1d at 174, 447 S.E.2d at 128.
197. Id
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evidence that [plaintiff) was not brought before a court for a probable
cause hearing within 48 hours of his arrest,"1"' as required by statute,' 99 and "that it was 'at least the de facto policy of the city not to
comply with that statutory mandate on weekends."' ° This evidence,
the court held, "and the inferences drawn from it, precluded summary
adjudication of [plaintiff's Section] 1983 claim."20 '
The other claimant alleged "that the city deliberately withheld
exculpatory information from the district attorney's office in spite of his
Brady motion, which constituted a policy subjecting the city to liability."2 2 Here, the court observed that liability could attach to "a policy
of failing to properly train employees about Brady material[s]" and that
municipal guidelines "for its employees to 'follow the law' amounted to
no guidance at all.' °s Accordingly, the court held this claimant as
well had stated a jury issue.' °
Although conspicuous by its presence, Mayor of Savannah v. Wilson
holds tantalizing promise for weary Section 1983 claimants in Georgia
courts.
c. Respondeat Superior. In Monell itself, the United States Supreme
Court explicitly qualified its imposition of Section 1983 responsibility.
Liability, the Court delineated, did not attach "solely because [the local
government] employs a tortfeasor--or, in other words, a [local government] cannot be held liable under [Section] 1983 on a respondeat
superior theory."05 Yet another issue descended for implementation
by the lower courts.
The Georgia Court of Appeals, in two recent opinions, has illustrated
that implementation continues. Brayman v. Deloach2° featured a
claim against the county for a "lesbian sexual relationship" that
developed between a minor and an employee of the county recreation
department.'" Summarily affirming summary judgment for the

198. Id.
199. O.C.G.A. § 17-4-62 (1997).
200. 214 Ga. App. at 171, 447 S.E.2d at 126.
201. Id.
202. Id.
203. Id. at 171-72, 447 S.E.2d at 126 (adopting the decision in Walker v. City of New
York, 974 F.2d 293 (2d Cir. 1992)).
204. Id. at 172, 447 S.E.2d at 126.
205. Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 691 (1978).
206. 211 Ga. App. 489, 439 S.E.2d 709 (1993).
207. Id. at 490, 439 S.E.2d at 710. The minor's mother, as next friend, filed the action
alleging that the relationship developed following the minor's participation in a softball
program sponsored by the county and that the offending employee worked for the county
parks and recreation department. Id.
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county,208 the court understood plaintiff's action to rest "solely upon

the county's alleged 'responsib[ilityl for the acts, omissions, wilful
indifference to consequences, and callous disregard of the consequences
of its agents and employees.' 2' So perceived, the cause was flawed:
"[Glovernmental entities cannot be held vicariously liable for the actions
of their employees . . . ." A subsequent instance, Gwinnett County
v. King,"' yielded a similar result. There, claimant alleged unconstitutional confinement as a result of improper termination from the
county's work release program.212 Reversing denial of summary
judgment for the county, the court emphasized that claimant "has
identified no policy of [the county) which was responsible for any of the
alleged deprivations." 18 Once again, the court asserted, "Under the
[Section] 1983 against local
law applicable to actions under ...
doctrine of respondeat superior is not a basis for
governments, the 214
imposing liability.

d. Deprivation. The federal statute's "deprivation" requirement2 5
continues to draw the Georgia Court of Appeals' sustained attention. In
declaring deprivation insufficient, the court frequently seizes upon the
basic tort concept of "duty." A conclusion of "no duty owing" often
equates a determination of no "deprivation" done. Illustrative of the
exercise, Cleveland v. Fulton County216 sought county responsibility for
delay in servicing a "911" call.217 Installing "deprivation" as the
action's "threshold element,"21 " the court then emphasized the absence

208. Id. at 493, 439 S.E.2d at 712. "It is undisputed that the actions of [the county
employee] were not done under the direction of or ratified by the county." Id. at 491, 439
S.E.2d at 711.
209. Id. at 492, 439 S.E.2d at 711.
210. Id.
211. 218 Ga. App. 800, 463 S.E.2d 511 (1995).
212. Id. at 800-01, 463 S.E.2d at 512. Following conviction and a sentence allowing
service in the work release program, plaintiff reported for work drunk and, under the
terms of the court order, was terminated from the program without credit for the time
previously served in the program. I&
213. Id. at 802, 463 S.E.2d at 513. "To impose liability, it must be shown that some
policy of [the county] was responsible for the violation of [claimant's] federally protected
rights.- Id.
214. Id.
215. 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
216. 196 Ga. App. 168, 396 S.E.2d 2 (1990).
217. Id. at 168-69, 396 S.E.2d at 2-3. Plaintiffs decedent, a diagnosed alcohol
dependent, was a patient at a state facility. When decedent suffered seizures, facility
personnel placed the "911" call that was received by the defendant adjoining county but
improperly delayed before transfer. Id.
218. Id. at 169, 396 S.E.2d at 3.
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of a count constitutional duty to provide emergency care services. 219
Neither, the court asserted, was there a duty-engendering "special

relationship" between the parties to the case. 2'

The county did not

cause decedent's condition, nor was decedent under county dominion or
control. As for the actual undertaking to provide medical care services,

"'it would be anomalous indeed to hold [the county) liable for providing
limited services which happen to be less extensive than a particular
citizen may desire.' 22 ' Accordingly, the court equated absence of a
constitutional emergency care "duty" with a failure of Section 1983

"deprivation."22
The duty issue again facilitated a disavowal of deprivation in Green

v. Moreland.2 '3 There, decedent's employer contracted with a county
to replace a bridge located within a municipality, and decedent was
killed while working on the project.2
Plaintiff charged both local
governments with due process violations in failing "to enact any safety
methods or procedures for construction projects.225 In appraising
plaintiff's claim, the court expressed conceptual difficulty in fitting facts
to theory. Although due process serves to limit state power, the court
reasoned, it imposes no affirmative obligation to protect against harms
from other means.226 The purpose of due process "'was to protect the

219. Id. "The Wideman case clearly establishes that 'there exists no ... general
[constitutional] right to the provision of medical care and services by the state.... .'" Id.
(quoting Wideman v. Shallowford Community Hosp., 826 F.2d 1030, 1034 (11th Cir. 1987)).
220. Id. "Such a 'special relationship' arises 'from the limitation which [the state] has
imposed on [the person's] freedom to act on his own behalf.'" Id. (quoting DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep't of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 200 (1989)).
221. Id. (quoting Wideman, 826 F.2d at.1036).
222. Id. at 170, 396 S.E.2d at 3. "Because appellants have failed to establish the
threshold element necessary to their 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim, it is not necessary for us to
reach the other elements of their claim." Id.
A second action based upon a county's improper response to a "911" call yielded the same
result in Hendon u. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992). There,
plaintiff's call went to his own county's emergency care system but was improperly classed
so that it did not receive the high-priority response warranted. See id. at 750-52, 417
S.E.2d at 707-08. Affirming dismissal of plaintiffs Section 1983 claim against the county,
the court reasoned that no federal deprivation had occurred because the county did not
create plaintiff's medical emergency and plaintiff was not in the county's custody or control.
Id. at 757, 417 S.E.2d at 712.
223. 200 Ga. App. 167, 407 S.E.2d 119 (1991).
224. Id. at 167, 407 S.E.2d at 120. Decedent was killed when a crane came in contact
with high-voltage overhead lines. Plaintiff received workers' compensation benefits from
the contractor and filed tort actions against the local governments. Id.
225. Id. at 169, 407 S.E.2d at 122.
226. Id. The court said that the due process clause "'orbids the State itself to deprive
individuals of life, liberty, or property without "due process of law," but its language cannot
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people from the State, not to ensure that the State protected them from
each other.' 22 7 Additionally, the court found no "special relationship"
between the parties giving rise to the contested duty. The local
governments had exercised no "coercion, dominion, or restraint" over the
decedent.'
The "duty-deprivation" exercise also controlled Washington v. Jefferson
County,2 ' a mother's claim for the death of her son. The death having
resulted from the son's fight with an arrestee who was then out on
bail,230 plaintiff charged the county with breaching its duty of public
protection.2 1 Once again, the court scored claimant's failure "to show
a nexus between [the son's] injury and any [local government] action."212 Without a "special relationship" between them, the county
was under no duty to protect the decedent "any more than any other
member of the general public."2 33 Decedent was not within the
county's custody and "did not face any special danger of assault by [the
arresteel, as distinguished from the danger to the general public."2 "
Accordingly, the absence of "duty" sealed the fate of "deprivation" and
suffered plaintiff's Section 1983 claim to adverse summary judg2
ment. 5

fairly be extended to impose an affirmative obligation on the State to ensure that those
interests do not come to harm through other means.'" Id. (quoting DeShaney, 489 U.S. at
195-96).
227. Id. at 169-70, 407 S.E.2d at 122.

228. Id. at 170, 407 S.E.2d at 122 (quoting Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App.
168, 169, 396 S.E.2d 2 (1990)). Additionally, the court reasoned, state statutes provided

safeguards against contact with high-voltage wires and thus the city or county could not
be held deliberately indifferent to the need. The court thus affirmed summary judgments
for the county and municipality. Id. at 170, 407 S.E.2d at 122-23.
229. 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996).

230. Id. at 81, 470 S.E.2d at 715. The arrestee had been arrested by the county sheriff
some four months previously and, while out on bond on charges of aggravated assault and
terroristic threats, got into a fight with plaintiff's son, shooting the son in the head.
Although the parties had also fought the previous weekend, the son had sought no

assistance from the sheriff. Id.
231. Id. "The gravamen of[plaintiff's] complaint is that [the arrestee] should not have
been released from jail because he was too dangerous. Specifically, [plaintiff] alleged that
[the county] negligently allowed bail for [the arrestee], breached a duty to protect the
public from [the arrestee], and failed to properly train personnel." Id.
232. Id. at 82,470 S.E.2d at 716. "Section 1983 imposes liability where persons acting

under color of state law have deprived a person of a federal constitutional or statutory
right." Id. at 82-83, 470 S.E.2d at 716.
233. I& at 83, 470 S.E.2d at 716.
234. Id. (citing DeShaney, 489 U.S. 189).
235. I& The court observed that once the sherifftestified to no assurances ofprotection
to the decedent:
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As the absence of duty undermines a claim in tort, therefore, so the
deficiency of deprivation devastates a claim in constitutional tort. The
Georgia courts' assimilation of the two elements can work disastrously
against the Section 1983 claimant.
e. Negligence. The Georgia Supreme Court, in its foundational
analysis of City of Cave Spring v. Mason,' fashioned its interpretation of Section 1983. As elaborated, the precept requires claimant's
demonstration of deprivation "pursuant to an impermissible or corrupt
policy which is intentional and deliberate." 7 The precept's focus upon
"intent" continues its hold upon the statute's Georgia evolution.
The court of appeals seized upon the element in Poss v. City of North
Augusta23 to dismiss a wrongful death claim resulting from a high
Pointing to "undisputed" municipal
speed chase by police officers.'
chase guidelines, the court discounted claimant's "unsubstantiated
In
allegations" of deliberate indifference or gross negligence.' 4
reliance upon the Cave Spring formulation, the court asserted that
"'automobile negligence actions ...

do not rise to a level of a constitu-

tional deprivation.'" 1
Plaintiff's collision with a police officer suffered a similar disposition
in Banks v. Mayor of Savannah.2 42 There, the court rejected a claim
that the city's driving instructions to its police officers violated plaintiff's
Claimant's allegation of other collisions, the
constitutional rights."
court maintained, indicated no more than municipal negligence.2 " A

[plaintiff] could no longer rest upon the mere allegations of his pleading but was
This he
required to set forth specific facts showing a genuine issue for trial ....

did not do. Because [plaintiff] failed to offer any specific facts which would give
rise to a triable issue, we find that summary judgment was properly granted as
to the 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim.

Id.
236. 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d 892 (1984).
237. Id. at 4-5, 310 S.E.2d at 893-94.
238. 205 Ga. App. 894, 424 S.E.2d 73 (1992).
239. Id. at 895, 424 S.E.2d at 74. Plaintiff's son was killed while riding in a car driven
by an unlicensed minor who was being pursued for failing to pay for gasoline, speeding,
and violating traffic signals. The driver lost control of the car, and both occupants were
killed in the crash. Id. at 894, 424 S.E.2d at 73-74.
240. Id at 895, 424 S.E.2d at 74. The court said the "very existence" of the guidelines
rebutted the allegations. Id.
241. I& (quoting Martin v. Georgia Dep't of Public Safety, 257 Ga. 300,305, 357 S.E.2d

569, 573 (1987)).
242. 210 Ga. App. 62, 435 S.E.2d 68 (1993).
243. Id. at 63, 435 S.E.2d at 70. Apparently, plaintiff had collided with a police car in
pursuit of police duties. Id. at 62, 435 S.E.2d at 70.
244. Id. "Moreover, evidence that other collisions have occurred involving city police
cars is not evidence of improper training of police officers, and does not create an inference
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claim under Section 1983 "is not a means to circumvent sovereign
immunity in cases involving negligence." 45 Rather, the court concluded, Section 1983 "applies only to acts of a governing body which deprive
a citizen of constitutional rights pursuant to 'an impermissible or corrupt
policy which is intentional and deliberate." 24
The Georgia lesson is thus apparent: When the Section 1983 claim
rises only to an assertion of "mere" negligence, that claim cannot
withstand the local government's motion for summary judgment.
V. GEORGIA LOCAL GOVERNMENTS AND CONSTITUTIONAL TORTS:
A SYNOPSIS
At this concluding juncture, the preceding chronological treatment
might be restructured into a topical synopsis. Indeed, a "Georgia
annotation" to the federal statute offers an enlightening frame of
reference.
(1) Every person... From inception to the present, the Georgia
courts have evidenced no conceptual qualms over the inclusion of
municipalities and counties within Section 1983's coverage of "persons."24 Thus, what assuredly constituted Monell's most controversial
analytical feat has gone uncriticized and unrefined in Georgia.
(2) ... who, under color ... The statute's "color" concept early
evoked analytical alarm in the Georgia evolution as facially capable of
ensnaring the conduct of every governmental employee while in the
course of employment. 2' The supreme court indicated an approach
conscious of those overbroadness prospects and dedicated to precluding
them. Thereafter, "color" appears to have played no overshadowing role
in the Georgia courts' analyses; neither the successes nor the failures of
Section 1983 turn upon a peculiar "color" perspective. Rather, the
Georgia exercise appears fairly straightforward, finding sufficient "color"
when the local governing authority takes action under the provisions of
its charter or statutes.249
(3) ... of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage
... The "custom or usage" issue has drawn a major amount of the
Georgia courts' attention. The supreme court early converted the issue

that officers are improperly trained." Id.
245. Id. at 63, 435 S.E.2d at 70.
246. Id. (quoting City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 5, 310 S.E.2d 892, 894
(1984)).
247. E.g., Atlanta Sch. Sys. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217, 466 S.E.2d 588 (1996); City of
Atlanta v. Fry, 148 Ga. App. 269, 251 S.E.2d 90 (1978).
248. See City of Cave Spring v. Mason, 252 Ga. 3, 310 S.E.2d 892 (1984).
249. See City of Athens v. McGahee, 178 Ga. App. 76, 341 S.E.2d 855 (1986).
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to that of "policy or custom," requiring specifically "an impermissible or
corrupt policy which is intentional and deliberate. "2W On occasion,
moreover, the Georgia search for "policy" narrows to whether it was
governmental policy to cause the damage, rather than to the governmental context in which damage resulted.25 1
Numerous Section 1983 complaints have failed on grounds of
the necessary "policy."
omitting,"' or insufficiently alleging,"
Proving particularly vulnerable on this score are complaints of single
incidents of unconstitutional conduct by nonpolicy-making employees.2 ' In the litigation prone context of law enforcement, the local
government generally prevails on the issue by demonstrating the
existence of promulgated guidelines.255 The government's position is
all the stronger when the guidelines consist of instructions to employees
that the court approves as acceptable interpretations of material
statutes."

Claimants' relatively rare successes on the issue encompass instances
in which the local government's offending policy is manifested in explicit
and unquestioned fashion. Examples include a discriminatory retirement plan adopted by local legislative action 2 7 and an
2 uncontradicted
failure to follow statutory probable cause procedures. 58
The Georgia "intentional and deliberately corrupt policy" formulation
also spills over to Section 1983's basis of liability. The formulation, that
is, leads to a continuing emphasis upon the element of "intent."
Repeatedly, the courts stress that "merely negligent" local government
conduct does not trigger applicability.25' That the conduct may imperil
8
Rather, the
life, liberty, or property is not the controlling concern.'
courts are determined that claims may not be advanced under cover of
Section 1983 in order to circumvent sovereign immunity in negligence
cases. 26 The federal statute, the courts steadfastly assert, does not

250. Cave Spring, 252 Ga. at 5, 310 S.E.2d at 894.

251.
252.
253.
254.
255.
256.
257.
258.
259.
260.
261.

E.g., City of College Park v. Grunden, 171 Ga. App. 814, 321 S.E.2d 371 (1984).
E.g., Pinkston v. City of Albany, 196 Ga. App. 43, 47, 395 S.E.2d 587, 590 (1990).
E.g., Armour v. Davidson, 203 Ga. App. 12, 416 S.E.2d 92 (1992).
E.g., Bell v. City of Albany, 210 Ga. App. 371, 436 S.E.2d 87 (1993).
E.g., Pose v. City of N. Augusta, 205 Ga. App. 894, 424 S.E.2d 73 (1992).
E.g., Mills v. City of Atlanta, 175 Ga. App. 8, 332 S.E.2d 319 (1985).
See City of Athens v. McGahee, 178 Ga. App. 76, 341 S.E.2d 855 (1986).
See Mayor of Savannah v. Wilson, 214 Ga. App. 170, 447 S.E.2d 124 (1994).
See Evans v. Clayton County, 182 Ga. App. 613, 356 S.E.2d 553 (1987).
Id.
See Banks v. Mayor of Savannah, 210 Ga. App. 62, 435 S.E.2d 68 (1993).
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elevate negligence actions to the realm of constitutional deprivations.'
(4) ... of any State or Territory... The conduct to which Section
1983 attaches is that of the local government and not the conduct
"solely" of local government employees. Georgia thus convincingly
perpetuates Monell's distinction between local government liability for
"policy or custom" and immunity from "vicarious responsibility." A
claimant's allegations or evidence of employees' offending acts, omissions, or even "callous disregard" do not justify recovery from the local
government.2
Claimants rendering such offerings in the Georgia
courts come promptly to understand that Section 1983 imposes
no local
2
government liability on a theory of respondeat superior. "
(5) ...

subjects, or causes to be subjected ...

As in other tort

domains, "causation" also casts its shadow across the province of
constitutional torts. For success under Section 1983, the Georgia courts
insist upon a sufficiently precipitating nexus between the government's
conduct and the claimant's injury The mere concurrence of the two
elements will not suffice.
In exacting the "causation" requirement in a constitutional tort case,
Georgia elaborates the concept in both its negligence senses: (1) "cause
in fact" and (2) "proximate cause." As for the former, if claimant's injury
would have occurred even in the absence of government's "policy or
custom" violation, then the causal connection is missing and Section
1983 liability is denied.2' As for the "proximate cause" analysis, if
claimant's injury did not fall within the reasonably foreseeable ambit of
risk created by government's offending conduct, then the causal link is
broken and no Section 1983 liability is imposed.s
An intriguing phenomenon thus emerges. Although the Georgia courts
may adamantly deny "mere negligence" as a basis of Section 1983
liability, their Section 1983 "causation" elaborations borrow heavily and
decisively from the negligence context.
(6) ... any citizen of the United States or other person within
the jurisdiction thereof... Georgians, and other persons within the
jurisdiction of Georgia, assuredly qualify for Section 1983 protections
against local governments. More broadly, however, several other
"jurisdictional" aspects also dot the constitutional tort landscape. Those

262.
263.
264.
265.
266.

See Poss v. City of N. Augusta, 205 Ga. App. 894, 424 S.E.2d 73 (1992).
See Brayman v. Deloach, 211 Ga. App. 489, 439 S.E.2d 709 (1993).
E.g., Gwinnett County v. King, 218 Ga. App. 800, 463 S.E.2d 511 (1995).
E.g., City of Roswell v. Davis, 255 Ga. 158, 335 S.E.2d 582 (1985).
Id.
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aspects work both to the advantage and to the disadvantage of Section
1983 claimants in the Georgia courts.
Advantageously, Section 1983 claimants are relieved from the
traditional procedural requirement that prior to litigation, they must
Additionally,
first exhaust available administrative remedies.26 7
Section 1983 claims against Georgia municipalities are free from the
ante litem notice mandate, the statutory prerequisite of notice to the city
within six months of the offending event.2' In both these "jurisdictional" respects, therefore, constitutional tort claimants enjoy pronounced
preferences over other Georgia litigants.
Disadvantageously, Section 1983 plaintiffs are held to Georgia's
general two-year statute of limitation on actions for personal injury.2"9
Additionally, claimants must accept the Georgia Supreme Court's
unrelenting aloofness to Section 1983 appeals. Except in special
instances, these claimants must recognize, the Georgia Court of Appeals
constitutes their appropriate appellate repository.2 7 ' In both these
"jurisdictional"respects, therefore, constitutional tort claimants enjoy no
peculiar advancement over other Georgia litigants.
(7) ... to the deprivation ...

As treated by the Georgia courts,

"deprivation" assumes a term-of-art countenance. In one setting, the
courts employ deprivation language when inquiring into the nature of
claimants' alleged rights. For "annotation" purposes, however, those
instances are treated under discussion of Section 1983's protected "rights
and privileges."
The more relevant examination of "deprivation" proceeds under
analytical cover of "duty." A popular instance of the exercise arises
when the court casts the Section 1983 issue as local government's duty
to provide protective services. At that juncture, negligence law's "no
duty of affirmative action" emerges with decisive impact.271 Indeed,
the no-duty precept may operate even more restrictively under Section
1983 than in the negligence context. For example, in a Section 1983
case, it appears immaterial that government actually undertook to

267. See Allen v. Bergman, 198 Ga. App. 57, 400 S.E.2d 347 (1990).

268. See City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 195 Ga. App. 72, 392 S.E.2d 564,
rev'd on other grounds, 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369 (1990); Armour v. Davidson, 203 Ga.

App. 12, 416 S.E.2d 92 (1992).
269. See Freeman v. City of Brunswick, 193 Ga. App. 635, 388 S.E.2d 746 (1989).
270. See Kroupa v. Cobb County, 262 Ga. 451, 421 S.E.2d 283 (1992).
271. E.g., Washington v. Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996);
Hendon v. DeKalb County, 203 Ga. App. 750, 417 S.E.2d 705 (1992); Green v. Moreland,
200 Ga. App. 167, 407 S.E.2d 119 (1991); Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App. 168,
396 S.E.2d 2 (1990).
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provide the service, thereby creating citizen reliance upon it.272 Absent
a "special relation" between government and claimant, the courts insist,
a conclusion of "no duty" is mandated. That conclusion, in turn,
frequently equals a determination that the local government has
subjected the claimant to no Section 1983 "deprivation."273
(8) ... of any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the
Constitution and laws ... The Georgia courts forthrightly confess
conceptual difficulties with the precise reach of this statutory language.
Early in the saga, the supreme court acknowledged the tension: on the
one hand, every lawsuit against a local government potentially
encompasses a federal constitutional issue; on the other hand, governmental abuses do not elevate ordinary torts to federal constitutional
violations.27 4

Such abuses,, even violations of Georgia's constitution

76
and statutes, do not necessarily trigger Section 1983's protections.
The courts continue their struggles with the delineations. For
example, local government arrest procedures in violation of state law do
2 76
not necessarily imply the deprivation of federal constitutional rights.
The same is true in respect to state law's creation of local government
tort immunities: No segment of due process protects against all

deprivations of life, liberty, or property.27 7

Conversely, local govern-

ment employee retirement benefits do claim the status of constitutionally
protected property. The government's unilateral cancellation of these
benefits
gives rise to an employee's sustainable claim in constitutional
278
tort.
(9) ... shall be liable to the party injured... Obviously, Section
1983's civil relief against local government operates only for claimants
exhibiting sufficient "injury." This point assumes crucial significance
when, as they often do, state court plaintiffs proceed concurrently in
state and federal law. On those occasions, the "sufficient injury"

272. E.g., Cleveland v. Fulton County, 196 Ga. App. 168, 396 S.E.2d 2 (1990).
273. E.g., Washington v. Jefferson County, 221 Ga. App. 81, 470 S.E.2d 714 (1996).
Recently, on a certified question from the Eleventh Circuit, the Georgia Supreme Court,
in respect to a state law negligence claim against a municipality, held that the "public duty

doctrine," under which the local government may not be held liable for its failure to provide
police protection based on a general duty to protect the public, does not apply outside the
police protection context. Hamilton v. Cannon, 267 Ga. 655, 482 S.E.2d 370 (1997). This
decision may operate to confine the "no duty, no deprivation" restriction in Section 1983
cases to the police protection context as well.

274. See Baranan v. Fulton County, 250 Ga. 531, 299 S.E.2d 722 (1983).
275. Id.
276. See Jarrett v. Butts, 190 Ga. App. 703, 379 S.E.2d 583 (1989); City of Marietta v.
Kelly, 175 Ga. App. 416, 334 S.E.2d 6 (1985).
277. See Sisson v. Douglas County Sch. Dist., 181 Ga. App. 77, 351 S.E.2d 272 (1986).
278. See City of Athens v. McGahee, 178 Ga. App. 76, 341 S.E.2d 855 (1986).
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requirement may relegate plaintiff's Section 1983 claim to a status of
nullity.
The illustrative scenario may arise, for example, when plaintiff's
charges include alleged violations of procedural due process. Should
those violations be assuaged under the proceeding's state law count,
plaintiff may then be deemed in receipt of "adequate state remedies."
Remedies so designated, the Georgia courts maintain, negate injury
entitled to further redress under Section 1983. This is true, moreover,
even though the state remedies admittedly fall short of what the federal
statute might have afforded the claimant.279 As a result, plaintiff's
Section 1983 count of the proceeding suffers preclusion, the courts
deeming it an impermissible effort at double recovery'
The above scenario may unfold in the context of a local government
employee's challenge to his or her termination. Should complainant's
state law proceeding for equitable relief yield reinstatement and back
pay, those remedies are deemed "adequate." As such, they preclude the
employee's claim for damages under Section 1983."1
(10) ... in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper
proceeding for redress. The Georgia courts have issued at least two
important cautions concerning the nature of remedies obtainable in
constitutional tort. From a general perspective, recoverable damages are
strictly limited to compensatory purposes. Consequently, the courts
emphasize, a claim under Section 1983 simply does not contemplate
damages for "the abstract value of a constitutional right." 2
More concretely, Section 1983 proceedings may encompass the familiar
issue of attorney fees for the "prevailing party" in the proceeding.
Should the local government prove to be that party, it may then recover
attorney fees only when plaintiff's Section 1983 claim was unreasonable,
frivolous, meritless, or vexatious. The claim falls prey to this stigma
when a governmental "policy or custom" is clearly absent from the case
and when claimant fails2 to pursue an obviously available tort remedy
against a private party. 83
VI.

CONCLUSION

Since 1978, constitutional tort litigation against municipalities and
counties has occupied inordinate space in the jurisprudence of local

279. See Henderson v. Sherrington, 189 Ga. App. 498, 376 S.E.2d 397 (1988).
280. E.g., City of Atlanta v. J.A. Jones Constr. Co., 260 Ga. 658,398 S.E.2d 369 (1990).
281. E.g., Atlanta City Sch. Dist. v. Dowling, 266 Ga. 217, 466 S.E.2d 588 (1996). See
also Jones v. Chatham County, 223 Ga. App. 455, 477 S.E.2d 889 (1996).

282. See J.A Jones Constr. Co., 260 Ga. 658, 398 S.E.2d 369.
283. City of College Park v. Grunden, 171 Ga. App. 814, 321 S.E.2d 371 (1984).
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government liability. Intriguingly, that jurisprudence has unfolded
along dual judicial tracks. With claimants proceeding in both federal
and state courts, the system produces two-tier elaborations of the same
"law."
Given academe's innate fascination with all things federal, extensive
analytical attention rarely devolves to the state elaborations. It falls the
individual lot of each lawyer, therefore, to monitor the Section 1983
cases in his or her own state's appellate judiciary.
When the Georgia activity is monitored, both chronologically and
topically, and then "annotated" to the language of the federal statute, it
reveals a jurisprudence highly deserving of independent reflection.

